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An Overview of Recent Legal Developments in South
Africa with Regard to the Position of Lesbigay Parents
and Children with Specific Reference to the Adoption of
Children*
J.A. Robinson
I. INTRODUCTION
A constitutional dispensation designed to innovate social, political,
and legal structures that would be radically different from those of South
Africa‘s past history1 came into effect in South Africa on April 27, 1994.
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 (hereafter
referred to as the Interim Constitution) not only recognized the injustices
of the past, but also depicted the new South Africa as an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom. To
this end, a Bill of Rights was entrenched in the Interim Constitution to
provide legally enforceable backing.2 In the new dispensation, any
* This contribution to some extent overlaps with articles published in the Forum Iuris
Internationalis, Franz Lizt Lecture Series (Justus Liebig University Gießen, Germany) under the title
―Children‘s Rights in the Constitution of South Africa‖ and J.A. Robinson, The Best Interests of
Children in Custody Litigation Where Homosexualism of a Parent is a Consideration, 2005 J. JURID.
SCI. 107.
1. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 (S. AFR. (Interim) CONST.
1993) came into effect on this date. It effected radical changes in the sense that henceforth the
franchise and associated political and civil rights would be accorded to all citizens without racial
qualification and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was now replaced by the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy. Thise Interim Constitution was formally adopted as an Act of the predemocratic Tri-cameral Parliament and was only meant to be a transitional constitution. One of its
principal purposes was to set out the procedures for the negotiation and drafting of the final
constitution. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 (S. AFR. CONST. 1996)
completes the negotiated revolution. Thise Constitution was drafted and adopted by an Elected
Constitutional Assembly which had been afforded two years to produce a constitution that
conformed to 34 constitutional principles agreed upon during the pre-1993 political negotiations. In
Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re Certification of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa (1996) (First Certification Judgment) 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) (S. Afr.) the
Constitutional Court refused to certify that the Constitution conformed to the said principles and it
was only in the so-called Second Certification Judgment 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) (S. Afr.) that the
Constitutional Court was prepared to find that the text was consistent with the constitutional
principles. The Constitution was signed into law by President Nelson Mandela at Sharpeville on
February 4, 1997. See JOHAN DE WAAL, IAIN CURRIE & GERHARD ERASMUS THE BILL OF RIGHTS
HANDBOOK ch 1 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter DE WAAL ET AL.].
2. In the preamble to the Interim Constitution, it is specifically stated that the injustices of
the country‘s past are recognized and that the Constitution is adopted as the supreme law of the
country so as to heal the divisions of the past and to establish a society based on democratic values,
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institution associated with the discrimination and repression practices of
apartheid South Africa would be incompatible with the values embodied
in the kind of society the country would henceforth aspire to be.3 The
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 (hereafter
referred to as the Constitution) echoes the values, principles, and norms
of the Interim Constitution.
Institutionalized discrimination constituted a major characteristic of
the political history of South Africa. Not only racial discrimination, but
also sex discrimination (including discrimination based on sexual
orientation) and age discrimination were inscribed into the social fabric
of apartheid South Africa. Consequently, the principle of equal treatment
and non-discrimination has been afforded a special place in the
Constitution. Section 9 of the Constitution therefore expressly prohibits
unfair discrimination, directly or indirectly, on grounds of, inter alia,
sexual orientation, sex, and age.4
The change in the political dispensation in 1994 has definitely
impacted the issue of gay/lesbian couples and children related to one (or
both) of the partners in the relationship. In view of the fact that the new
constitutional dispensation reflects radically new values and norms, a
proper understanding of the legal status of such relationships is only
possible if cognizance is taken of the legal-historical background of such
relationships and children. It is also clear that constitutional prescriptions
pertaining to such relationships on the one hand, and to children‘s rights
within such relationships on the other, must form the focal point of this
contribution. The contribution focuses on the influence of homosexuality
of a parent in matters pertaining to adoption of children against the
background of recent developments relating to the parent-child
relationship.

social justice, and fundamental human rights. S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 pmbl.
3. J.D. Van der Vyver, Constitutional Protection of Children and Young Persons, in THE
LAW OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 265, 267 (J.A. Robinson ed., 1997).
4. In fact, South Africa is the first state to expressly prohibit discrimination on grounds of
sexual orientation in its constitution. A distinction needs to be drawn between sex and sexual
orientation. ‗Sex‘ is a biological term, whereas ‗gender‘ is a social term. ‗Sex‘ therefore refers to the
biological and physical differences between men and women. Discrimination based on sex would
therefore occur, for example, in situations in which pregnant women are discriminated against on
that basis. Gender, on the other hand, refers to the ascribed social and cultural male and female roles.
An example of gender discrimination would therefore be prejudicial treatment arising out of
parenting roles. See DE WAAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 215.
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II. THE PRE-1994 PERIOD
A. Historical Background
Before 1994, the Westminster system of government applied in
South Africa, accompanied by the principle of sovereignty of Parliament.
Therefore, courts of law did not have the competence to question the
legality of parliamentary legislation. The famous dictum of Blackstone
that ―[w]hat the parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo‖
indeed held true for the position in South Africa and had a marked
influence on formal attitudes towards marriage and families.5
The concept of marriage, as it existed in this period, to a substantial
extent reflected the position in Canon law and Roman Dutch law. Canon
law, basically Roman law modernized and adapted to meet the needs of
the medieval church, was received into Roman Dutch law.6 The Catholic
Church of the Middle Ages was not only a spiritual institution. It was
also a state with its own legislature and courts of law. The jurisdiction of
the Church not only included all matters concerning the organization and
property of the Church, but also matters connected with faith,
sacraments, and sin.7 The Church‘s jurisdiction overlapped to some
extent with that of secular courts. The means by which the Church
secured enforcement of its decrees was excommunication. However,
judgments of ecclesiastical courts were enforced by Government qua the
secular arm of the Church.
The sources of Canon law were primarily the Bible, the writings of
Church fathers, Justinian‘s codification of the Corpus Juris, the canons
of Church councils, and the decretals of the popes.
The Church teaches, as a matter of revealed truth, that ―Christ our Lord
elevated the very contract of marriage between baptized persons to the
dignity of a sacrament.‖ . . . Thus, the marriage contract between two

5. Perhaps the correct point of departure to understand the socio-legal background currently
prevailing in South Africa is to reflect on the notions of Afrikaner nationalism and especially the
religious inclination of the Afrikaner. The combination of these two factors provided a dominant
consideration within the constitutional dispensation in the period before 1994. In the period
stretching from the early 1930s, Afrikaner nationalism became a strong driving force in the country.
In essence, though, Afrikaner nationalism was intertwined with the religious dogma of Jean Calvin.
As such, it created a framework which had a definite impact on views held by the legislature and the
courts on the nature of marriage and families. The constitutional exposition, as set out, held true
until 1994. See W.J. HOSTEN, CARMEN NATHAN, A.B. EDWARDS & FRANCIS BOSMAN,
INTRODUCTION TO SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 315 (1977).
6. H.R. HAHLO & ELLISON KAHN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS
BACKGROUND 511 (1968).
7. Id. at 511.
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married persons is a sacrament—‖an outward sign instituted by Christ
to give grace.‖ The ―outward sign‖ here is the mutual external
manifestation of internal consent by the two parties to the marriage
contract. . . . It is the contract of marriage which is the sacrament. An
invalid contract is, in fact, a non-existent contract and hence cannot be
8
a sacrament.

The status created by marriage as a sacrament was instituted by God; it
was a natural relationship whose ends and essential properties were
determined by natural law. These ends and properties could not be varied
by human legislation, either civil or ecclesiastical, or by the consent of
the parties. ―The primary end or purpose of marriage, as instituted by
God, is the procreation and rearing of children.‖9
Roman Dutch Law embraced Montesquieu‘s philosophies that the
powers of legislation, administration, and adjudication had to be
separated and that each had to be entrusted to a different organ with the
legislature supreme.10 The old ecclesiastical courts were abolished and
the Reformed Church became the State Church of the Netherlands. By
virtue of the ius majestas circa sacra, the Church was subject to control
by government. Matters relating to doctrine and service were left solely
to the decision of the clerical authorities, but all matters relating to the
position of the Church in the community and the legal consequences of
acts performed in church, including marriage, were henceforth the
concern of the State.11 Through the ius supremae inspectionis,
government exercised supervision over the appointment of ministers in
the Church.
The marriage law of this period was prescribed in the Political
Ordinance of 1580 and the Perpetual Edict of 1540. Both these
instruments reflected the philosophies of the Reformation and to some
extent secularized marriage law. Even though the doctrine of the
sacramental nature of marriage was disclaimed, the idea of marriage
being a divine institution in its general origin subsisted. The rules of
Canon law, which had their foundation not in the sacrament or in any
religious view of the subject but in marriage as a natural and civil
contract, were retained.12 Therefore, in view of Biblical texts it was
accepted that marriage is a relationship between one man and one

8. Joseph M. Snee, S.J., The Canon Law of Marriage: An Outline, 35 U.DET. MERCY L.
REV. 309, 311–12 (1958) (quoting 1917 CODE c.1012, § 1).
9. Id. at 313.
10. HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 6, at 528.
11. Id.
12. H.R. HAHLO, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE 11 (3d ed.).
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woman. It was especially the comparison of the relationship between a
husband and a wife with that of Christ and His congregation that
provided for the view of marriage as a relationship exclusively between
one man and one woman.13
The exclusive definition of the nature of marriage as it existed in
Roman Dutch law was received part and parcel into South African law.
Besides numerous Roman Dutch texts, South African courts also referred
often to the well-known English decision in Hyde v Hyde and
Woodmansee,14 in which it is stated that ―[m]arriage as understood in
Christendom is the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman,
to the exclusion of all others.‖ The biblical justification for marriage as
an exclusive relationship between one man and one woman was reflected
holus bolus by the moral and legal climate predating the Interim
Constitution.15
B. The Institution of Marriage Before 1994
South African courts have from time to time reconsidered the nature
of marriage. The position the courts took, however, was a relatively
simple one. In Seedat’s Executors v The Master (Natal), the issue before
the court related to a potentially polygamous union.
Bearing in mind the essential characteristics of marriage, it is clear that
the union in question was not a marriage, as we understand it. It parties
contracted, but forbidden by our own and fundamentally opposed to our
principles and institutions. And it is impossible for our Courts when
dealing directly with the position of a party to such a union to say that
she ever was the wife in the sense in which our law uses that term. . . .
It is a hard result . . . that a woman validly married in one part of the
British Empire should not be treated as a wife in another part. But relief
16
can only properly be sought from the Legislature.

The monogamous form of marriage—though it was open to all
population groups irrespective of race, nationality, or religion—was out
of step with fundamental views held by groups of different cultural and
religious backgrounds. The pressure exerted by this state of affairs led to
various statutory enactments which, on an ad hoc basis, conferred some
13. See Ephesians 5:23–33.
14. L.R. 1 P. & D. 130, 130 (1866).
15. C.R.M. Dlamini, The Role of Customary Law in Meeting Social Needs, 1991 ACTA
JURIDICA 71, 75 (1991).
16. 1917 A.D. 302 at 309 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added).
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of the consequences—patrimonial and personal—on relationships
resembling that of marriage. In this fashion it was intended to alleviate
some of the harsh consequences that followed the non-recognition of
unions which did not conform to Roman Dutch prescripts.17 In addition
to the statutory measures mentioned above, it should be noted that
Roman Dutch law already made provision for marriages that were void
ab initio and that consequently possessed none of the consequences of a
valid marriage to be accepted as putative. If the marriage had been
solemnized with prescribed formalities (quod matrimonium fuerit rite et
solemniter secundum morem patriae contractum) and at least one of the
spouses had contracted the marriage in good faith (quod adfuerit bona
fides in facto ipsorum contrahendium, vel saltem unius eorum) certain of
the effects of a legal marriage would attach to it.18
Within the framework set out above, it was rather predictable how
courts would deal with issues falling outside of the ambit of the marriage
description reflected by Roman Dutch law. Contentious issues that came
before the courts from time to time related to the position of same-sex
partners—the question of whether people who had undergone a sexchange operation could conclude a marriage and the recognition of
religious marriages. The court in all these instances applied the concept
of marriage as reflected in Roman Dutch law: essentially it was a
relationship between one man and one woman and no exception would
be accepted.19
C. Constitutional Background to the Legal Position of Gay/Lesbian
Parents and Children Related to Their Relationship
In the era of parliamentary sovereignty, Parliament was the supreme
law-making authority in the state and all citizens and organs of state,
including the courts, were subservient to Parliament.20 As a result, there
were no particular judicial constraints on Parliament. A court could only
declare an act invalid if it had not been passed in accordance with the
procedures for passing legislation that had been laid down in the

17. See generally Felicity Kaganas & Christina Murray, The Contest Between Culture and
Gender Equality Under South Africa’s Interim Constitution 21 J.L. & SOC‘Y 409 (1994) (for a
comprehensive exposition of such enactments).
18. HAHLO, supra note 12, at 11.
19. Respecting sex change operations, see W v W 1976 (2) SA 308 (W) (S. Afr.); Simms v
Simms 1981 (4) SA 186 (D&C) (S. Afr.); with regard to Muslim marriage, see Ismail v Ismail 1983
(1) SA 1006 (A) (S. Afr.); Seedat’s Ex’rs v The Master 1917 A.D. 302 (S. Afr.); in relation to samesex relationships, see Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W) (S. Afr.).
20. See Harris v Minister of the Interior 1952 (2) SA 428 (A) (S. Afr.); Minister of the
Interior v Harris 1952 (4) SA 769 (A) (S. Afr.).
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Constitution—the courts could not review parliamentary legislation on
substantive grounds.21 There was no provision for a court to declare an
act of Parliament invalid on the grounds that it, for instance, violated
fundamental human rights or that it was against the boni mores.
Contrary to the situation with regard to parliamentary legislation,
courts were frequently called upon to adjudicate issues of common law
on the basis of the boni mores. In Olsen v Standaloft22 the court
conveyed that the mores is not a static concept; in fact, since they reflect
the fundamental assumptions of the community, the mores vary from
country to country and era to era:
Such flexibility may manifest itself in two ways: by closing down of
existing heads of public policy and by the opening of new heads. There
is no doubt that an existing head of public policy may be declared
redundant . . . .
A final observation may be made as to the way in which the courts
determine the content of public policy. Apart from reliance on previous
precedents, this is done by a priori deductions from broad general
principles. It is not the practice . . . for parties to lead sociological or
economic evidence as to whether particular practices are harmful and it
is doubtful to what extent such evidence would be regarded as relevant
23
if it were adduced.

The reference to ―deductions from broad general principles‖ may
justifiably lead to the conclusion that the determination of the boni mores
rested squarely within the discretion of a presiding judge. The possibility
that was left for the personal inclinations of judges when they had to
decide on mores pertaining to legal questions had been criticized
severely. One author explains that the mores had clearly been tainted by
the fact that judges had been mostly elderly, white males from
Calvinistic backgrounds.24 The correctness of this critique for purposes
21. See, e.g., Harris v Minister of the Interior 1952 (2) SA 428 (A) (S. Afr.).
22. 1983 (2) SA 668 (ZSC) (S. Afr.).
23. N.C. SEDDON & M.P. ELLINGHAUS, CHESHIRE AND FIFOOT‘S LAW OF CONTRACT 331
(9th ed., 2008) (emphasis added).
24. In Minister of Law & Order v Kadir, the court pronounced as follows on the subject:
[A]s the judgments . . . illustrate, conclusions as to the existence of a legal duty in cases
for which there is no precedent entail policy decisions and value judgments which ‗shape
and, at times, refashion the common law [and] must reflect the wishes, often unspoken,
and the perceptions, often dimly discerned, of the people. . . . What is in effect required is
that, not merely the interests of the parties inter se, but also the conflicting interests of the
community, be carefully weighed and that a balance be struck in accordance with what
the court conceives to be society’s notions of what justice demands.
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of this contribution is borne out by the decision in Van Rooyen v. Van
Rooyen25 as will be discussed infra.
D. Van Rooyen v. Van Rooyen
In Van Rooyen the mother of two children born from her marriage to
the father of the children, and which marriage had been dissolved by a
decree of divorce which incorporated an order that the father was to have
custody of the children, applied for an order defining her rights of access
to the children. The sole issue before the court revolved around the
mother‘s involvement in a lesbian relationship and sharing a house and
bedroom with a same-sex partner.
Holding that the application turned on the question of what was in
the best interests of the two children,26 the court conveyed that, ―What
the experts say is to me so self-evident that, even without them, I believe
that any right-thinking person would say that it is important that the
children stay away from confusing signals as to how the sexuality of
male and female should develop.‖27
Against this background, the court argues that the mother can live in
whatever way she likes, but insofar as the interests of the children require
it, she must make a choice between persisting in lesbian activity and
having access on a more broadly defined basis. The choice regarding her
bedroom life, the court decides, is hers, but she cannot make a choice
that limits what should appropriately be done in regard to children.28
From this point of departure, the court argues that
[a]t an age where these children soon become 12, 13, 14, they are very
quick to pick up the signals of a separate class of male or female
typing. The signals are given by the fact that the children know that,
1995 (2) SA 1 (A) (S. Afr.) (emphasis added). In Sasfin v Beukes the court explains that, ―judges are
more to be trusted as interpreters of the law than as expounders of what is called public policy,‖ but
that it is nevertheless still left to the courts to determine whether a contract is contrary to public
policy. 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) (S. Afr.). It then proceeds to explain that
one must be careful not to conclude that a contract is contrary to public policy because its
terms . . . offend one‘s individual sense of propriety and fairness . . . the doctrine should
only be invoked in clear cases in which the harm to the public is substantially
incontestable, and does not depend upon the idiosyncratic inferences of a few judicial
minds.
Id.
25.
26.
27.
28.

1994 (2) SA 325 (WLD) (S. Afr.).
Id. at 326 B.
Id. at 328 J (emphasis added).
Id. at 329 F.
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contrary to what they should be taught as normal or what they should
be guided to as to be correct (that it is male and female who share a
bed), one finds two females doing this and not obviously for reasons of
lack of space on a particular night but as a matter of preference and a
matter of mutual emotional attachment. That signal comes from the fact
that they know the bedroom is shared. It is detrimental to the child
because it is the wrong signal. The wrong signals are given when . . .
29
there are signs of emotional attachment.

The decision in Van Rooyen has been criticized severely.30 It is
argued that the court in casu had made a moral judgment about what was
normal and correct insofar as sexuality was concerned. Furthermore,
there can be no doubt that the court regarded homosexuality as being
abnormal per se.31 Bearing in mind that the decision was given before the
Interim Constitution came into force, it is clear that the court‘s a priori
deduction from general principles, which it considered to reflect the boni
mores, led to this conclusion. It goes without saying, therefore, that the
criticism leveled against the pre-1994 dispensation—that the convictions
of male, Calvinist middle-aged judges sometimes dictated the very
essence of the mores—indeed holds true.

29. Id. at 330 A–C (emphasis added).
30. The common law definition of marriage in South Africa for many years reflected the only
legally recognized family form in South Africa. The institution of marriage carried with it a plethora
of legal rights and obligations. It was (and still is) regarded as the cornerstone of society—a fixed
traditional structure essential for the raising of children and a healthy family. In fact, marriage has
enjoyed a uniquely privileged status. However, the argument has been made that lawmakers should
abandon what has been described as ―archaic, moralistic rules‖ so as to provide legal recognition to
other forms of relationships. See SOUTH AFRICAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, PROJECT 118:
REPORT ON DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS 5 (2006), available at http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/reports
/r_prj118_2006march.pdf.
31. Belinda van Heerden, Judicial Interference with Parental Power, in BOBERG‘S LAW OF
PERSONS AND THE FAMILY 545 (2d ed. 1999) (explaining that in the absence of any empirical
evidence to support the conclusion that children raised by gay or lesbian parents are exposed to any
greater dangers or are more likely to suffer from psychiatric, social, gender-identity, or other
disorders than children raised by heterosexual parents in comparable circumstances, this judgment
smacks of blatant homophobia). This viewpoint has been echoed by a number of authors. See id. at
n.173.
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III. THE POST-1994 PERIOD—CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND
NORMS RELATING TO GAY/LESBIAN PARENTS AND CHILDREN RELATED
TO THEIR RELATIONSHIP
A. Introduction
As referred to in Part I, the new constitutional dispensation begun in
1994 radically impacted legal development in South Africa.32 The new
constitutional dispensation deviated from the pre-constitutional era
where Christianity and the world-view of the Afrikaner were favored.
South Africa is an open and democratic society with a non-sectarian
state that guarantees freedom of worship; it is respectful of, and
accommodatory towards, rather than hostile to or walled-off from,
religion; acknowledges the multi-faith and multi-belief nature of the
country; does not favour one religious creed or doctrinal truth above
another; accepts the intensely personal nature of individual conscience
and affirms the intrinsically voluntary and non-coerced character of
belief; respects the rights of non-believers; and does not impose
orthodoxies of thought or require conformity of conduct in terms of any
particular world-view. The Constitution, then, is very much about the
acknowledgement by the State of different belief systems and their
accommodation within a non-hierarchical framework of equality and
33
non-discrimination.

To illustrate the impact of the Constitution on the legal position of
gay/lesbian couples and their children in South Africa, a general
overview of constitutional principles and provisions will be given.
Thereafter, the focus will fall on the progress of the debate with specific
reference to the Constitutional Court‘s viewpoints on the subject.
B. The Constitutional Grundnorm
The Grundnorm of the Constitution—the basic norm which, in the
case of a discrepancy between different constitutional interests, will
override any other constitutional provision that comes into conflict with
it—is a product of the country‘s past. It is constituted by the equal
protection and non-discrimination provisions in the Constitution. The
provision that South Africa is to be an open and democratic society based

32. See discussion supra Part I, ¶ 1.
33. S v Lawrence 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC) at para 151 (S. Afr.).
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on human dignity, equality, and freedom, makes it clear that in the case
of a conflict of constitutional interests, human dignity and equality will
be the primary considerations.34
The provisions regarding equal protection and non-discrimination are
found in section 9 of the Constitution. Amongst others, these provisions
prohibit unfair discrimination on grounds of race, gender, sex,
pregnancy, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief,
culture, language, and birth. The legislature is also tasked to enact
national legislation to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.
Discrimination on one or more of the grounds set out above will be
considered unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.
Broadly speaking, it would appear that the constitutional position
regarding discrimination reflects a teleological approach—the purpose of
differentiating between categories must dictate the ethical propriety of
the basis employed to differentiate between such categories. In other
words, the ―basis of the classification of groups of persons for the
purpose of differentiating in law between these categories must be truly
relevant with a view to the legal purpose to be served by the
classification.‖35 Equal protection, therefore, does not per se mean actual
equality in the arithmetical sense that would negate all differentiation
between categories of people. If the classification is founded on a
reasonable basis, and it is truly relevant to the purpose it is meant to
serve, classification and differentiation for purposes of law may well fall
within a definition of equal treatment. Of course, practicality and legal
certainty must also prevail.
C. The Application of the Constitution
The constitutional provisions that have a direct bearing on the
position of homosexuals are sections 8, 9, 39 and 36. Sections 28(1)(b),
28(1)(c), and 28(2) relate to the constitutional protection of children‘s
rights and will be considered below.
1. Section 8 read with section 39(2)—application of constitutional
norms and principles
From the provisions of section 8(1), it is clear that the Bill of Rights,
true to nature, binds all organs of state. The sub-section reads that the
Bill ―applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the
34. See S v Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.); Van der Vyver, supra note 3, at
283.
35. Van der Vyver, supra note 3, at 289.
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judiciary and all organs of state.‖36 As this provision is self-explanatory,
no further attention will be paid to it except to indicate that ―law‖ in
these sections is to be interpreted broadly. What is designated by this
provision, therefore, is that ―law‖ means positive law which includes
statutory law, common law and customary law in contradistinction to
where law is simply translated as ―Act‖ (“wet”).37
Sections 8(2) and 8(3) also provide for the application of the Bill in
the sphere of private law issues. As such, the phraseology in which the
horizontal application of provisions of the Bill is couched is juxtaposed
with the developmental function of the court in respect of the common
law. Section 8(2) and 8(3) provides as follows in this regard:
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person
if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature
of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or
juristic person in terms of subsection (2), a court—
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if
necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does
not give effect to that right; and
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided
38
that the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1).

These sub-sections apply to all instances where the regulatory law,
which either affords legality to the decision taken or act performed or
which prohibits such conduct through private law proscriptions or
sanctions, is part of the common law. A court is therefore obligated to
36. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 8(1).
37. Van der Vyver, supra note 3, at 268 n.23.
38. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ss. 8(2)–(3). It is clear that in contradistinction to section 8(1),
natural and juristic persons are only bound by the Bill of Rights to the extent that a provision of the
Bill is applicable in view of the nature of the right and the duty imposed. Questions concerning the
horizontal application of the Bill can therefore not be determined a priori and in the abstract. In fact,
from the very wording of section 8(3) it appears that whether a provision of the Bill applies
horizontally will depend on the nature of the private conduct in question and the circumstances of
the particular case. The extent to which a provision is applicable can only be determined by
reference to the context within which it is sought to be relied upon. If, however, the provisions of
section 8(2) do find application, the duty to uphold, endure or execute the right vests in a natural or
juristic person; similar to the position with regard to organs within the State structure as set out in
section 8(1).
The purpose of a provision is an important consideration to determine whether it is
applicable to private conduct or not. By the same token, the nature of any duty imposed by the right
must also be taken into account. Private or juristic persons are often driven primarily by a concern
for themselves while the State, on the other hand, should rather be motivated by a concern for the
well-being of society as a whole. The application of the Bill should therefore not undermine private
autonomy to the same extent that it places restrictions on the sovereignty of parliament.
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consider the permissive or proscriptive rule applicable to conduct of the
duty-bound person with two primary questions in mind: Does the
concerned rule of the common law in any way frustrate the
constitutionally protected right implicated by the decision or act of the
duty bound subject? Does the concerned rule of the common law permit
limitations of the constitutionally protected right which do not comply
with the demands of the limitations provision of the Constitution?
If the answer to either of these questions is yes, a court has an
obligation to ―develop‖ the common law in order to give effect to the
constitutionally protected right and/or to bring the limitation of that right
as sanctioned by the common law in conformity with the limitation
demands of the Constitution.39 It is also clear that development of the
39. The form of application in section 8(2) reflects the so-called indirect application of the
Bill of Rights. In this instance a dispute is resolved by interpreting a statute or developing the
common law so as to promote the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill through the operation of
ordinary law. When the Bill is directly applied, however, the question is whether there is any
inconsistency between the Bill and the law or conduct in question. If so, such law or conduct
unjustifiably violates the Bill and a remedy provided for by the Constitution will be given to the
applicant. See DE WAAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 167.
Remedies flowing from a direct application of the Bill to law and conduct are provided
for in sections 38, 172(1), 8(3) and 39(2). These sections provide as follows:
Section 38: Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a
right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate
relief, including a declaration of rights.
Section 172(1): When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court –
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is
invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and
(b) may make an order that is just and equitable, including –
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any
conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.
Section 8(3) has been referred to already. See supra text accompanying note 37.
Section 39(2): When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill
of Rights. (See infra text accompanying note 42.)
Prima facie there appears to be an overlap between the provisions of sections 39(2) and 8(3). On
closer scrutiny, however, it is clear that there is a marked difference in the sense that section 8(3)
establishes a law creating power, whereas the competence vested in a court by s 39(2) in regard to
the common law is one of applying its normal power of interpretation in favorum libertatis with the
spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution as a substantive directive. See Van der Vyver, supra
note 3, at 274. Van der Vyver warns, though, that the distinction between law creation in terms of
section 8(3) and development through interpretation pursuant to section 39(2) is difficult to define
with any degree of precision. The language of section 8(3) indicates the power of the court to add to
the common law provisions that would afford protection of constitutionally defined rights which the
common law as such would otherwise not have provided. It furthermore adds to the common law
limitations of constitutionally protected rights in their application to natural and juristic persons
which will conform with the limitation provisions of the Constitution in all instances where the
common law confinement of such rights falls short of the constitutional limitation conditions and
requirements.
The provisions of section 172(2)(a) of the Constitution should also be borne in mind.
This section provides that the Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court or a court of similar status
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common law in terms of section 8(2) entitles a court to read
constitutional rights into the common law which the common law would
otherwise not have protected.40 The court may also rewrite common law
limitations pertaining to a particular right which is now also protected by
the Constitution so as to equate those limitations with the constitutional
conditions for, and requirements of, such limitations.41
Section 39(1) and (2) must be read in conjunction with sections 8(2)
and (3). These subsections determine as follows:
(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum—
(a) must promote the values that underlie a democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom;
(b) must consider international law; and
(c) may consider foreign law.
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum

may make an order concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament. However, such an
order will have no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court.
40. Petersen v Maintenance Officer, Simon‘s Town Maintenance Court 2004 (2) SA 56 (C)
(S. Afr.); Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) (S. Afr.); Carmichele v Minister of Safety &
Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) (S. Afr.).
41. Van der Vyver, supra note 3, at 271. Van der Vyver points out that courts are given lawcreating powers which by far exceed those exercised previously by the High Court in respect of the
common law. The fact that implementation of section 8(3) powers amounts to the courts usurping
the function of the legislature and as such violates the separation of powers, which constitutes a
salient component of the new constitutional dispensation is, however, of no relevance after the
decision of the Constitutional Court in In re Certification of the Amended text of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1997 1 BCLR 1 (CC) (S. Afr.). See supra note 1. Having
endorsed the revised Constitution, the Constitutional Court afforded incontestable sanction to these
powers. It is furthermore important to note that whereas in the past principles of natural justice
served as a criterion of the judicial developmental function, the courts must now look to the
Constitution to find the norm of rights protection, and of the limitation of rights that must be
incorporated into the common law.
It has been held in a number of cases, however, that in exercising their powers to develop
the common law, judges should be mindful of the fact that the major engine for law reform should
be the legislature and not the judiciary. In Du Plessis v De Klerk, the court held that
Judges can and should adapt the common law to reflect the changing social, moral and
economic fabric of the country. Judges should not be quick to perpetuate rules whose
social foundation has long since disappeared. Nonetheless there are significant
constraints on the power of the Judiciary to change the law. . . . In a constitutional
democracy such as ours it is the Legislature and not the courts which has the major
responsibility for law reform. . . . The Judiciary should confine itself to those incremental
changes which are necessary to keep the common law in step with the dynamic and
evolving fabric of our society.
1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at para 61 (S. Afr.) (quoting R. v Salituro 1992 (8) C.R.R. 173); see also
Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Sec. 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at para 36 (S. Afr.); Petersen v Maint.
Officer, Simon‘s Town Maint. Ct. 2004 (2) SA 56 (CPD) (S. Afr.).
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must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.

Section 173 of the Constitution provides that all higher courts have
the inherent power to develop the common law, taking into account the
interests of justice. All courts are obliged to promote the spirit, purport,
and object of the Bill of Rights when developing the common law. It
follows implicitly, therefore, that where the common law deviates from
the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill, the courts have an obligation to
develop it by removing that deviation. The obligation of courts to
develop the common law is not purely discretionary. On the contrary, the
reading together of these two sections conveys that where the common
law, as it stands, is deficient in promoting the section 39(2) objectives,
courts are under a general obligation to develop it appropriately.
However, while ―general obligation‖ does not mean per se that a court
must in each and every case where the common law is involved embark
on an independent exercise to determine whether the common law is in
need of development and, if so, how it is to be developed under section
39(2), it may happen that there may be circumstances where a court will
be obliged to raise the matter on its own and require full argument from
the parties.42 Where the common law has to be developed beyond
existing precedent, there are two stages to the inquiry the court has to
undertake, even though they cannot be separated hermetically. First, the
court must consider whether the existing common law requires
development in accordance with the objectives of section 39(2). Should
this inquiry lead to a positive answer, the second stage concerns itself
with how such development is to take place in order to meet the section
39(2) objectives.43
The prescripts of the common law as interpreted in Van Rooyen
clearly conflict with section 8 and 39(2), which enact the constitutional
obligation of South African courts to develop the common law with
regard to homosexual persons so as to bring it in line with the provisions
of the Constitution. While the Constitution‘s status as the supreme source
of the mores of the community is confirmed by these provisions, courts
are entrusted with the task of interpreting constitutional values and
applying such values to develop the common law.

42. Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Sec. 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at para 39 (S. Afr.).
43. See cases cited supra note 38.
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2. Section 9—the equality clause
Section 9 of the Constitution entails the so-called equality clause. In
terms of this provision, everyone is equal before the law and has the right
to equal protection and benefit of the law. Equality includes the full and
equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. However, to promote the
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to
protect or advance persons (or categories of persons) disadvantaged by
unfair discrimination may be taken. The state is therefore forbidden to
unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on a number of
grounds set out in section 9(3). These include, inter alia, sex and sexual
orientation. Private persons are also forbidden to discriminate unfairly on
these grounds. In terms of section 9(5), discrimination on one of the
grounds will be deemed unfair unless it is established that the
discrimination is fair.44
In Harksen v Lane NO,45 the Constitutional Court set out the stages
of an inquiry into a violation of the equality clause:
(a) Does the provision differentiate between people or categories of
people? If so, does the differentiation bear a rational connection to a
legitimate government purpose? If it does not then there is a violation
of s 8(1). Even if it does bear a rational connection, it might
nevertheless amount to discrimination.
(b) Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This
44. It is clear that a distinction must be drawn between substantive and formal equality.
Formal equality would simply mean that all persons are equal bearers of rights—that the law must
treat individuals in the same manner irrespective of their circumstances; a so-called neutral
norm/standard of measurement. Substantive equality on the other hand, takes the personal
circumstances into account and requires the law to ensure quality of outcome. This form of equality
requires an examination of the actual social and economic conditions of groups and individuals in
order to determine whether the Constitution‘s commitment to equality is being upheld. It goes
without saying that a purely formal understanding of equality would risk neglecting the deepest
commitments of the Constitution. A substantive conception of equality would, in contradistinction,
be supportive of these fundamental values. In President of the Republic of S. Afr. v Hugo, the
Constitutional Court indicates a clear preference for substantive equality:
We . . . need to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which recognizes that although
a society which affords each human being equal treatment on the basis of equal worth
and freedom is our goal, we cannot achieve that goal by insisting upon identical treatment
in all circumstances before that goal is achieved. Each case, therefore, will require a
careful and thorough understanding of the impact of the discriminatory action upon the
particular people concerned to determine whether its overall impact is one which furthers
the constitutional goal of equality or not. A classification which is unfair in one context
may not necessarily be unfair in a different context.
1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) at para 41 (S. Afr.).
45. 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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requires a two stage analysis:
(b)(i) Firstly, does the differentiation amount to ―discrimination?‖ If it
is on a specified ground, then discrimination will have been
established. If it is not on a specified ground, then whether or not there
is discrimination will depend upon whether, objectively, the ground is
based on attributes and characteristics which have the potential to
impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or to
affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner.
(b)(ii) If the differentiation amounts to ―discrimination,‖ does it amount
to ―unfair discrimination?‖ If it has been found to have been on a
specified ground, then unfairness will be presumed. If on an
unspecified ground, unfairness will have to be established by the
complainant. The test of unfairness focuses primarily on the impact of
the discrimination on the complainant and others in his or her situation.
If, at the end of this stage of the enquiry, the differentiation is found not
to be unfair, then there will be no violation of section 8(2). [now
sections 9(3) and 9(4)]
(c) If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will
have to be made as to whether the provisions can be justified under the
46
limitations clause.

In essence, the criterion set out above means that there is a
preliminary inquiry as to whether the impugned provision or conduct
differentiates between people or categories of people. Of course, if there
is no differentiation, there is no question of a violation of the provisions
of section 9. However, if a provision does differentiate, a two-stage
analysis must be applied. The first stage ((a) above) concerns the right to
equal treatment and equality before the law and aims at determining
whether the provision has a rational basis—if there is a rational
connection between the differentiation in question and a legitimate state
purpose that it is designed to further or achieve. If the conclusion is
negative, the impugned provision violates section 9 and fails the first
stage. If, on the other hand, the differentiation is shown to be rational, the
second stage of the enquiry ((b) above) is activated. A differentiation that
is rational may, however, constitute unfair discrimination when such
differentiation relates to the specific grounds on which it is forbidden to
discriminate unfairly. In principle, both unfair discrimination and
differentiation without a rational basis can then in terms of section 3647
be justified as limitations of the right to equality.48
46. Id. at paras. 41–53.
47. See accompanying text supra note 47.
48. DE WAAL ET AL., supra note 1, at ch. 7.
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3. Section 36—the limitation of constitutionally protected rights
Section 36(2) provides that a limitation of a constitutionally
protected right must comply with the prescriptions of section 36(1) or
with the dictates of any other provision of the Constitution. In terms of
section 36(1) the limitation of a constitutionally protected right must
adhere to the following requirements: the limitation must be sanctioned
by law of general application; the limitation must be reasonable; the
limitation must be justifiable in an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom taking into account all relevant
factors, including the nature of the right, the importance of the purpose of
the limitation, the nature and extent of the limitation, the relation
between the limitation and its purpose, and also less restrictive means to
achieve the purpose. It is to be noted that ―law of general application‖
reflects a broad definition of law, including limitations sanctioned by
statutory provisions and the common law.49 The requirement of
reasonableness was held to mean that ―a law or action limiting a right to
freedom must have a reasonable goal and the means for achieving that
goal must be reasonable.‖50
The further qualification that limitations of a fundamental right must
be justifiable in an open and democratic society clearly envisages a
society that differs fundamentally from the one associated with apartheid
South Africa. In fact, the true nature of this requirement only comes to
the fore when cognizance is taken of the provisions of section 7(1),
which in essence elevate the democratic values of human dignity,
equality, and freedom to the status of being the ultimate normative
sources of the rights enshrined in the Bill; and of section 39(1), which
compels a court to promote the values that underlie an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom when
interpreting the Bill.51
The structure of the inquiry as set out above appears to be quite
systematic—one first considers whether there has been a violation of the
49. Van der Vyver, supra note 3, at 277.
50. See Coetzee v Gov‘t of the Republic of S. Afr. 1995 (4) SA 631 (CC) (S. Afr.).
51. In Coetzee v Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr., the Constitutional Court held that ―[w]e
need to locate ourselves in the mainstream of international practice‖ to establish what is meant by
this requirement. 1995 (4) SA 631 (CC) at para 51 (S. Afr.). It is furthermore illuminating to bear the
Preamble of the Constitution in mind. Specific reference is made to the motivation for the
Constitution qua supreme law of the country to achieve the following: (1) Heal the divisions of the
past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human
rights; (2) Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on
the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; (3) Improve the quality of life of
all citizens and free the potential of each person; and (4) Build a united and democratic South Africa
to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations.
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right to equality before the law and then considers whether there is unfair
discrimination. If the right to equal treatment has been violated there will
be no need to consider whether there has been a violation of the nondiscrimination right.52
D. The Interpretation of the Constitutional Principles with Regard to
Homosexual Relationships
The societal approach towards homosexuality is progressively
changing. This is reflected in jurisprudence in which constitutional
norms and values are applied to the issue of homosexuality. In a number
of cases relating to the crime of sodomy, the courts reflected on the
changed mores in clear terms . In S v M the court held that ―the majority
of people who have normal heterosexual relationships, may find acts of
sodomy unacceptable and reprehensible. We cannot close our eyes,
however, to the fact that society accepts that there are individuals who
have homosexual tendencies and who form intimate relationships with
those of their own sex.‖53 In S v H the court was very critical of the
phrase ―normal heterosexual relationship‖ as employed in S v M on the
basis that it ―implies that homosexual relationships are abnormal in a
sense other than the mere fact that they are statistically in the minority.‖54
The court then proceeds as follows:
In my respectful view the use of the word ―normal‖ in this context is
unfortunate, as it might suggest a prejudgment of much current
psychological and sociological opinion which is critical of various
conventions and assumptions regarding human sexuality. It may also
suggest a wrong line of enquiry when coming to re-evaluate the status
of homosexual relationships. I would suggest that a more fruitful legal
enquiry might be directed at concepts of privacy and autonomy and the
issue whether private intimacy per se between consenting adult males
can ever cause harm to society any more than private heterosexual
55
intimacy between consenting adults.

52. See, e.g., National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1998 (6)
BCLR 726 (W) (S. Afr.). In this case the court held that it need not inevitably perform both stages of
the enquiry. This was because the first-stage rational basis inquiry would be unnecessary in a case in
which the court holds that the discrimination is unfair and unjustifiable. This simply means that in
those cases in which a court finds that a law or conduct unjustifiably infringes sections 9(3) or 9(4)
there is no need to consider whether the law or conduct is in violation of section 9(1).
53. 1990 (2) SACR 509 (E) (S. Afr.) (emphasis added).
54. 1995 (1) SA 120 (C) at 124C (S. Afr.).
55. Id. at 124E.
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The court further accepts with approval the approach followed in Bowers
v Hardwick,56 which held that the assertion that traditional JudeoChristian values proscribed particular conduct could not provide an
adequate justification for certain statutory enactments. The state had no
license to impose the judgments of religious groups that condemned the
behavior at issue on the entire citizenry. The court in casu further
conveyed that the legitimacy of secular legislation rather depended on
whether the state could justify its law beyond its conformity to religious
doctrine.
In Brink v Kitshoff the court decided that section 8 was adopted to
recognize that discrimination against people who were
members of disfavored groups could lead to patterns of group
disadvantage and harm, and that such discrimination would be unfair in
the sense that it would build and entrench inequality amongst different
groups in the South African society. The drafters of the Constitution
realized that it was necessary both to proscribe such forms of
discrimination and to permit positive steps to redress the effects of such
57
discrimination.

Against this background it was held in National Coalition for Gay and
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice58 that the desire for equality is not
a hope for the elimination of all differences. However, ―the experience of
subordination—of personal subordination, above all—lies behind the
vision of equality.‖ To understand ―the other,‖ the court held, one must
try as far as is humanly possible to place oneself in the position of ―the
other.‖ The court stressed that the determining factor regarding
unfairness of discrimination is the impact of the discrimination on the
members of the affected group.59
56. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
57. 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) (S. Afr.).
58. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. Afr.) .
59. The approach to this determination is a nuanced and comprehensive one in which various
factors come into play which, when assessed cumulatively and objectively, will assist in elaborating
and giving precision to the constitutional test of unfairness. Important factors to be assessed in this
regard (which do not constitute a closed list) are: (1) The position of complainants in society and
whether they have suffered in the past from patterns of disadvantage. (2) The nature of the provision
or power and the purpose sought to be achieved by it. If its purpose is manifestly not directed, in the
first instance, at impairing the complainants in their fundamental human dignity or in a comparably
serious respect, but is aimed at achieving a worthy and important societal goal as . . . the furthering
of equality for all, this purpose may, depending on the facts of the particular case, have a significant
bearing on the question whether complainants have in fact suffered the impairment in question. (3)
With due regard to (1) and (2) above, and any other relevant factors, the extent to which the
discrimination has affected the rights or interests of complainants and whether it has led to an
impairment of their fundamental human dignity or constitutes an impairment of a comparably
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The progressive approach regarding sodomy as set out above is also
reflected in a number of cases relating to the consequences pertaining to
gay/lesbian relationships. In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian
Equality v Minister of Home Affairs, the court referred to the changing
mores as affirmed in the so-called sodomy cases and moved on to the
nature of same-sex relationships.60 It stated that the sting of the
discrimination against gays and lesbians is reflected in the message that
it conveys that they, whether viewed as individuals or in their same-sex
relationships, do not have inherent dignity and are not worthy of the
human respect possessed by and accorded to heterosexuals in their
relationships.
This discrimination occurs at a deeply intimate level of human
existence and relationality. It denies to gays and lesbians that which is
foundational to our Constitution and the concepts of equality and
dignity, which at this point are closely intertwined, namely that all
persons have the same inherent worth and dignity as human beings,
whatever their other differences may be. The denial of equal dignity
and worth to all too quickly and insidiously degenerates into a denial of
humanity and leads to inhuman treatment by the rest of society in other
ways. This is deeply demeaning and frequently has the cruel effect of
undermining the confidence and sense of self-worth and self-respect of
61
lesbians and gays.

Against this background, the court concludes that a statutory
enactment exempting ―spouses,‖ and not partners, in a permanent samesex relationship from certain statutory provisions is discriminatory
against such partners. Accepting that the provision in casu was aimed at
achieving the societal goal of protecting the family life of ―lawful
marriages,‖ the court considers the impact of being excluded from these
protective provisions of same-sex partners.62 In its deliberations, the
court conveys that marriage creates a consortium omnis vitae, ―a
physical, moral, and spiritual community of life,‖ and that ―over the past

serious nature. See Nat‘l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at
para 19 (S. Afr.).
60. 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) at para 41 (S. Afr.).
61. Id. at para 42.
62. In casu the decision dealt with section 25 of the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991. An
application was brought for an order declaring this article to be inconsistent with the provisions of
the Constitution on the basis that it discriminated against partners in a same-sex relationship, in that
section 25(5) of the Act provided for an exemption from the provisions of section 25(4) for a spouse
of a person permanently and lawfully resident in South Africa. By implication this exemption did not
extend to partners in same-sex life partnerships.
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decades an accelerating process of transformation has taken place in
family relationships, as well as in societal and legal concepts regarding
the family and what it comprises. The impact of the failure in the statute
to also exempt partners in a same-sex relationship is therefore to
reinforce harmful and hurtful stereotypes of gays and lesbians.‖63
Section 10 of the Constitution recognizes and guarantees that
everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have his or her dignity
respected and protected. The court therefore comes to the following
conclusion:
[G]ays and lesbians have a constitutionally entrenched right to dignity
and equality; sexual orientation is a ground expressly listed in section
9(3) of the Constitution and under section 9(5) discrimination on this
ground is unfair unless the contrary is established; prior criminal
proscription of private and consensual sexual expression between gays
arising from their sexual orientation and which had been directed at gay
men, has been struck down as unconstitutional; gays and lesbians in
same-sex life partnerships are as capable as heterosexual spouses of
expressing and sharing love in its manifold forms, including affection,
friendship, eros and charity; they are likewise as capable of forming
intimate, permanent, committed, monogamous, loyal and enduring
relationships; of furnishing emotional and spiritual support; and of
providing physical care, financial support and assistance in running the
common household; they are individually able to adopt children and in
the case of lesbians, to bear them; in short, they have the same ability to
establish a consortium omnis vitae; and finally, they are capable of
constituting a family, whether nuclear or extended, and of establishing,
enjoying, and benefiting from family life which is not distinguishable
64
in any significant respect from that of heterosexual spouses.

63. The court refers to two typical arguments that bolster the prejudice against gay and
lesbian sexuality. In the first place, gays and lesbians are classified as exclusively sexual beings
(compared to perception of heterosexual people who, along with many other activities in their lives,
occasionally engage in sex). In the second place, the argument is found that gays and lesbians cannot
procreate in the same way as heterosexual people and therefore should not be allowed to adopt
children. In this regard the Court points out that gays and lesbians are indeed individually permitted
to adopt children in terms of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 and that nothing prevents a gay or
lesbian couple, a partner of which has adopted a child, from treating such child in all ways, other
than strictly legally, as their child. They can indeed love, care, and provide for the child as though it
was their joint child. Nat‘l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA
1 (CC) at paras. 49–50 (S. Afr.); see also cases cited infra note 86.
64. Nat‘l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) at
para 50 (S. Afr.).
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The rights to equality and dignity go to the core of the constitutional
democratic values of human dignity, equality, and freedom. The forming
and sustaining of intimate personal relationships in same-sex fashion are
for many individuals essential for their own self-understanding and for
the full development and expression of their human personalities. The
omission of such partnerships in the present case is therefore found to
limit the right to enter into a permanent personal relationship with
another at a deep and serious level.65
IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND
NORMS TO GAY/LESBIAN PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN
A. Recognition of New Family Structures
The concept of family has undergone major changes in view of
constitutional principles and norms. An accelerating process of
transformation has taken place in family relationships, as well as in the
societal and legal concepts regarding the family and what it comprises.66
This observation is borne out by the following argument of the
Constitutional Court in Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs:
The importance of the family unit for society is recognized in the
international human rights instruments . . . when they state that the
family is the ―natural‖ and ―fundamental‖ unit of our society. However,
families come in different shapes and sizes. The definition of the family
also changes as social practices and traditions change. In recognizing
the importance of the family, we must take care not to entrench
67
particular forms of family at the expense of other forms.

The decision in Dawood hardly comes as a surprise. In fact, one can
describe it as a logical conclusion of a line of reasoning that has been
developing over the last decade. The founders of the Constitution
deliberately refrained from including a provision recognizing the family
as the basic unit of society. In In re Certification of the Constitution of
the RSA the Constitutional Court explained that a survey of international
instruments conveyed that in general, states have a duty, in terms of
international human rights law, to protect the rights of persons to marry
freely and to raise a family.68 The duty on states to protect marriage and
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at para 58.
Id. at para 47.
2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) at para 31 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added).
1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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family life has been interpreted in a multitude of different ways. By no
means has there been universal acceptance of the need to recognize the
rights to marriage and to family life as being fundamental in the sense
that they require express constitutional protection.69 The court then
proceeded to explain that the absence of marriage and family rights in
many African and Asian countries reflects the multi-cultural and multifaith character of such societies.
Families are constituted, function and are dissolved in such a variety of
ways, and the possible outcomes of constitutionalising family rights are
so uncertain, that constitution-makers appear frequently to prefer not to
regard the right to marry or to pursue family life as a fundamental right
that is appropriate for definition in constitutionalised terms. They
thereby avoid disagreements over whether the family to be protected is
a nuclear family or an extended family, or over which ceremonies, rites
or practices would constitute a marriage deserving of constitutional
protection. . . . These are seen as questions that relate to the history,
culture and special circumstances of each society, permitting of no
70
universal solutions.

It is also clear from the decision that the Constitutional Court
refrained from providing a definition of a family. In its views of the
nature of gay/lesbian relationships the Constitutional Court has also
made it clear that from a legal and constitutional point of view
procreative potential is not a defining characteristic of conjugal
relationships. It was held in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian
Equality v Minister of Home Affairs71 that a view to the contrary would
be deeply demeaning to couples (whether married or not) who, for
whatever reason, are incapable of procreating when they commence their
relationship or become so anytime thereafter. It is likewise demeaning to
couples who commence such a relationship at an age when they no
longer have the desire for sexual relations. It may even be demeaning to
a couple who voluntarily decides not to have children or sexual relations
with one another; this decision is entirely within their protected sphere of
freedom and privacy.
The approach of the Constitutional Court has served as the basis for
a number of decisions radically deviating from the approach in Van
Rooyen. In Ex Parte Critchfield the court concluded that

69. Id. para. 98.
70. Id. para. 99.
71. 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) para. 51 (S. Afr.).
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[i]n a society such as ours which proscribes discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation, these encounters can be viewed in no more
serious a light than conventional adultery. . . . [I]n my view, the Court
should not be particularly concerned with the sexual predilections of
litigants when it comes to custody matters. It encourages a voyeurism
in public life that demeans us all. It is an entirely different matter where
such predilections pose an actual or potential threat to the welfare,
72
psychological or physical, of young children.

In V v V it was found that the court in Van Rooyen had made a moral
judgment about what was normal and correct with regard to sexuality
and about homosexuality, which it found to be abnormal per se.73
Referring to the limitations allowed by the Constitution on fundamental
rights, the court explains that there may well be situations where a court
will override the equality clause in the best interests of the child, but it
would then consider the reasonableness of such limitations. The court
concluded, therefore, that an order by a court discriminating against a
lesbian mother who applies for access rights to her children that is based
solely on her sexual orientation will not easily pass constitutional muster.
In the same way a court cannot take cognizance of racism or religious
intolerance when it decides on the access of the mother to her children, it
cannot take cognizance of prejudice in the society. To do that would be
to unreasonably limit, or perhaps even negate, the essential content of the
right not to be discriminated against on the ground of sexual orientation.
The Constitution ―does allow for fundamental rights to be limited by
law of general application where the limitation is reasonable and
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and
equality, and where it does not negate the essential content of the
right.‖74 While it is clear that ―currently existing bigotry and its
consequences [does not in itself] create a valid reason to limit the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of a gay or lesbian parent,‖ it is
equally clear that while the child is growing up there may be strong
recrimination from peers and other parents against such child when it
becomes known that his or her parent is gay or lesbian. The child may
also become confused by the parent‘s unwillingness to conform to a
generally accepted norm. There is in terms of the equality clause indeed
nothing abnormal or wrong about a homosexual relationship, but it may
be in the best interests of a child to discriminate against its homosexual
72. 1999 (3) SA 132 (W) (S. Afr.) (emphasis added).
73. 1998 (4) SA 169 (C) (S. Afr.).
74. See discussion supra Part III.C.
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parent if that would be the only way in which the child would be spared
75
unnecessary suffering.

B. Evaluation of South African Jurisprudence Relating to Lesbigay
Parents and Children
One can discern three different standards for how the homosexuality
of a parent should be applied by a court in respect of lesbigay parents and
children. The first standard is the so-called per se approach. This
standard generally holds that a homosexual parent is unfit as a matter of
law. The court does not have to consider any factors concerning the
child‘s best interests, but can categorically deny custody to the
homosexual parent. The second standard is the presumption of harm or
middle ground approach. In determining the fitness of the homosexual
parent, the court following this approach will conclude that declaring a
lesbian mother unfit as a matter of law is improper, and that other factors
affecting the best interests of the child must also be considered.
However, even though the parent is not per se considered to be an unfit
parent, the court presumes that the child will suffer because of the social
stigma attached to the parent‘s homosexuality. This approach condemns
the homosexual conduct but not the homosexual person. Applying this
approach, a court may find a homosexual parent unfit because the social
stigma attached to homosexuality may be detrimental to the child.
Consequently, the court will often forbid the child to have contact with
the parent‘s homosexual lifestyle.76 The third standard is the nexus
approach. This approach resolves many of the problems of the first
mentioned standards and takes a parent‘s sexual preference into
consideration as only one of many factors. Homosexuality will only be
held against a parent if there is a nexus between the parent‘s sexual
preference and the possible harmful effects on the child. The application
of this standard requires that the homosexuality of a parent has an
adverse effect on the child before it may be taken into account. The
nexus standard does not consider homosexuality by itself or the
homosexual behavior as a valid consideration for denying custody; it
only considers the parent‘s sexual orientation when it has an adverse
effect on the child‘s best interests.77 It needs no elaboration that the per
75. Pierre De Vos, The Right of a Lesbian Mother to Have Access to Her Children: Some
Constitutional Issues 111 S. AFR. L.J. 687, 691 (1994).
76. Katja M. Eichinger-Swainston, Note, Fox v. Fox: Redefining the Best Interest of the
Child Standard for Lesbian Mothers and Their Families 32 TULSA L.J. 57 (1996); Eileen P. Huff
The Children of Homosexual Parents: The Voices the Courts Have Yet To Hear 9 AM. U.J. GENDER
SOC. POL‘Y & L. 695, 699 (2001).
77. Eichinger-Swainston, supra note 76, at 59; Huff, supra note 76, at 700.
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se standard finds no place in the new constitutional dispensation in South
Africa. No further attention will therefore be paid to this approach.78
Van Rooyen appears to reflect a middle ground approach in that the
court does not condemn the lesbian mother, but does condemn her
lesbian conduct. The order of the court in terms of which the children
may not have contact with the mother‘s lesbian lifestyle rests on this
conclusion. The middle ground approach is also evident in the plaintiff‘s
argument before the court in V v V79 and the court‘s apparent acceptance
of the argument. The plaintiff was prepared to allow defendant (who had
been involved in a lesbian relationship) supervised access to the children
only. Unsupervised access was only to be granted if a psychiatrist
certified that it was in the best interests of the children that defendant had
access to them, and then only under the condition that no other person
slept under the same roof (apparently referring to the mother‘s lesbian
partner).
The court took as its starting proposition the idea that the child‘s
rights are paramount and need to be protected, and further, that situations
may well arise where the best interests of the child require that action is
taken for the benefit of the child which effectively cuts across the
parents‘ rights. The court then appeared to take the following part of an
article of De Vos as basis for its argument:
Section 33(1) [of the Interim Constitution] allows for these rights to be
limited by law of general application, where the limitation is reasonable
and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and
equality, and where it does not negate the essential content of that right.
Does this mean that a more subtle justification for the same order
would be constitutionally valid? In other words, will currently existing
bigotry and its consequences be a valid reason to limit the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the lesbian mother? The argument
could be formulated as follows: There is nothing inherently wrong or
abnormal about a lesbian relationship. But while the child is growing
up, there will be strong social recrimination from peers and other
parents against the child as it becomes known that his or her mother is
a lesbian. The child might also become confused and distressed by his
or her mother‘s unwillingness to conform to a generally accepted norm.
It might therefore be in the best interests of the child to discriminate
against the lesbian mother, because that will be the only way in which

78. The court‘s explanation that children should be kept away from signals that are contrary
to what is considered normal or correct may even reflect the per se standard.
79. 1998 (4) SA 169 (CPD) (S. Afr.).
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From the court‘s reference to the Canadian decision in R v Oakes81
that a discriminatory order against a lesbian mother in an application for
access rights to her children that is solely based on her sexual orientation
will not easily pass constitutional muster, it is clear that the court
distances itself from the per se approach. The Oakes decision, however,
elaborates on this basis, seemingly accepting the nexus standard. It states
that in the same way that the court cannot take cognizance of racism or
religious intolerance when it decides on the access of the mother to her
children, it cannot take cognizance of prejudice in the society. To do that,
the Oakes decision holds, would be to unreasonably limit, or perhaps
even negate, the essential content of the right not to be discriminated
against on the ground of sexual orientation.
On the evidence before it, the court found that the children were not
so embarrassed by the situation of their mother that it prevented them
from having friends stay with them at their mother‘s house overnight,
even when the mother‘s partner was there. In fact, in the opinion of the
court the defendant was a ―good and suitable mother.‖ It may be
concluded, therefore, that the court appeared to be vacillating between
the nexus and middle ground approaches. The part of De Vos‘ argument
referred to by the court falls squarely within the framework of the middle
ground approach. Referring to Oakes without further elaboration may,
on the other hand, be indicative of the court‘s acceptance of the nexus
approach.
As previously quoted, in Ex Parte Critchfield the court concluded
that:
[i]n a society such as ours which proscribes discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation, these encounters can be viewed in no more
serious a light than conventional adultery. . . . [I]n my view, the Court
should not be particularly concerned with the sexual predilections of
litigants when it comes to custody matters. It encourages a voyeurism
in public life that demeans us all. It is an entirely different matter where
such predilections pose an actual or potential threat to the welfare,
82
psychological or physical, of young children.

Critchfield clearly reflects the nexus standard. This standard takes
the parent‘s homosexuality into account as one of many factors in
80. De Vos, supra note 75, at 691–92 (emphasis added).
81. [1986] 26 DLR 200 (Can.).
82. 1999 (3) SA 132 (W) (S. Afr.) (emphasis added).
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determining what is in the best interests of the child. The homosexuality
of the parent will be held against him or her only if there is a clear nexus
between his or her conduct and any harmful effects on the child. The
court‘s remark that it should only be concerned with the sexual
predilections of litigants when it comes to custody matters and where it
poses an actual or potential threat to the welfare of children, bears out on
this approach.
C. Conclusion
It is suggested that the nexus standard applied in Critchfield better
reflects the constitutional values and norms expressed by the
Constitutional Court in the decisions regarding homosexuality and
families as set out above. This standard does not focus on anyone‘s
morality, but rather on the best interests of the child. Where
homosexuality of a parent becomes an issue in litigation, the correct
approach, it is suggested, is to establish whether there is a nexus between
behavior that may be detrimental to the best interests of the child and the
effect of the behavior on the child. In this way the best interests of the
child are protected without infringing on the parent‘s sexual privacy.
V. THE APPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND TO THE
ADOPTION OF CHILDREN
The exposition in paragraphs III(D) and IV(A) above makes it
abundantly clear that the Constitutional Court has acknowledged that:
(1) the concept of family has changed to comply with modern day
demands;
(2) the mere fact of homosexuality does not prevent same-sex life
partners from forming a family and that their relationship may
establish a consortium omnis vitae;
(3) statutory provisions prohibiting same-sex life partners from
jointly adopting a child postulate infringements of the Constitution
and are therefore invalid (thereby acknowledging that homosexual
parents and adopted children may form a family in the legal sense of
the word);
(4) it would be unconstitutional to regard homosexuality per se as a
ground justifying a negative attitude towards a parent in litigation
pertaining to children—in fact, gays and lesbians can meet the
constitutional requirements for the exercising of parental care as well
as any heterosexual person can; and
(5) gays and lesbians may be considered to be the primary caregivers
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of children in their custody when living together in a family
relationship.
This change in attitude is borne out specifically by the decision in Du
Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development,83 in which the
court found that the status of the applicants as unmarried persons, which
precluded them from adopting siblings jointly, was inextricably linked to
their sexual orientation. This decision related primarily to section 17(a)
of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983,84 which provides that a child can be
adopted, inter alia, by a husband and a wife jointly; it does not provide
for the joint adoption of children by partners in a permanent same-sex
life partnership.85 The evidence before the court showed that the
applicants who were same-sex life partners were eminently suitable to
jointly adopt a child.86 They approached the High Court because of the
Children‘s Court‘s decision to award custody and guardianship in terms
of section 17(a) only to one applicant despite both applicants having
been recommended jointly as suitable parents. The applicants argued that
section 17 unfairly discriminated against gay and lesbian parents on the
grounds of sexual orientation and marital status and that the absolute
prohibition of joint adoptions by same-sex parents cannot be in the best
interests of adoptive children who are placed in the families of adoptive
parents involved in permanent same-sex life partnerships.
The court repeatedly reiterated its recognition of the changed concept
of the family.
Recognition of the fact that many children are not brought up by their
biological parents is embodied in s 28(1)(b) of our Constitution which
guarantees a child‘s right to ―family care or parental care.‖ Family care
includes care by the extended family of the child, which is an important
feature of South African family life. It is clear from s 28(1)(b) that the
Constitution recognises that family life is important to the well-being of
all children. Adoption is a valuable way of affording children the
benefits of family life which might not otherwise be available to
them. . . . However, we must approach the issues in the present matter

83. 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) (S. Afr.).
84. In terms of section 17(b) of the Act, a widower, widow, unmarried person, or divorced
person can adopt a child. This is adoption by a single applicant.
85. ―Husband‖ and ―wife‖ refers only to marriages ordinarily recognized by the common law
and legislation between heterosexual spouses.
86. The first applicant stated that she had played a significant role in the upbringing of the
children and that the children regarded her as their mother. She was their principal source of
emotional support due to the fact that the second applicant‘s career as a judge of the High Court
placed severe strains on her time. The evidence clearly showed that the children have developed well
and that they were aware of applicants‘ lesbian life style.
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on the basis that family life as contemplated by the Constitution can be
provided in different ways and that legal conceptions of the family and
what constitutes family life should change as social practices and
87
traditions change.

From this perspective the court proceeded to conclude that the
impugned provisions excluded from their ambit potential joint adoptive
parents who were unmarried, but were partners in a permanent same-sex
life partnership and who would otherwise meet the criteria set out in the
Child Care Act. Their exclusion, the court held, defeated the very
essence and social purpose of adoption which is to provide for the
stability, commitment, affection, and support important to a child‘s
development, which can be offered by suitably qualified persons.
Excluding same-sex life partners from adopting children jointly was
clearly in conflict with the constitutionally entrenched principle of the
best interests of the children in these circumstances. The provisions
therefore deprived the children of the possibility of a loving and stable
family life. This, the court stated, was a matter of grave concern given
the social reality of parentless children in the country.88
87. Du Toit v Minister of Welfare & Population Dev. 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) at paras. 18–19
(S. Afr.) (emphasis added).
88. Id. at paras. 21–22. The Court found that the non-recognition as a parent, in the context of
her relationship with the second applicant and their relationship with the siblings, perpetuated the
fiction of family homogeneity based on the one mother/one father model. The failure by the law to
recognize the value and worth of the first applicant as a parent to the siblings was, the court found,
demeaning and limited her right to dignity.
In J v Director-General, Department of Home Affairs, the constitutionality of section 5 of
the (now repealed) Children‘s Status Act 82 of 1987 was considered. 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) (S.
Afr.). This Act dealt with, inter alia, the status of children conceived by artificial insemination. In
casu the second applicant gave birth to twins, a boy and a girl. They were conceived by artificial
insemination. The male sperm was obtained from an anonymous donor and the female ova were
obtained from the first applicant. Both applicants wanted to be registered and recognized as parents
of the twins. There was no legal impediment with regard to the second applicant as the ―birthmother‖ being registered as a parent under the regulations in terms of the Births and Deaths
Registration Act 51 of 1992. However, these regulations only made provision for the registration of
one male and one female parent. Children‘s Status Act 82 of 1987 § 5(1)(a):
Whenever the gamete or gametes of any person other than a married woman or her
husband have been used with the consent of both that woman and her husband for the
artificial insemination of that woman, any child born of that woman as a result of such
artificial insemination shall for all purposes be deemed to be the legitimate child of that
woman and her husband as if the gamete or gametes of that woman or her husband were
used for such artificial insemination.
The Court in essence followed the line of reasoning of Du Toit but went on to say that just as the
legal consequences of marriage are many and complex, the mutual relationship between parent and
child is complex, valuable and multi-faceted. In the same vein as it was not appropriate for Courts to
determine the details of the relationship between partners to same-sex (or heterosexual
relationships), so little was it for them to work out the relationship between any such partners and
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Although the court did not specifically refer to any of the approaches
relating to homosexuality of a parent and children, it is clear that it did
follow the nexus approach as explained above. The court relied strongly
on the report of a social worker, who recommended both applicants as
suitable parents and also declared that it would be in the best interests of
the children to be adopted by the applicants jointly. The court also
pointed out that in terms of the Child Care Act, the children‘s court may
not grant an adoption unless it is satisfied, inter alia, that
(a) the applicants are possessed of adequate means to
maintain and educate the child;89
(b) the applicant or applicants are of good repute and a person
or persons fit and proper to be entrusted with the custody of the
child;90 and
(c) the proposed adoption will serve the interests and conduce
to the welfare of the child.91
In terms of the Child Care Act, children‘s courts are charged with
overseeing the well-being of children by examining the qualifications of
applicants in adoption applications. The provisions of the Act, the court
found, offered a coherent policy of child and family welfare by creating
children‘s courts and establishing overall guidelines to advance the
welfare of children. They are able and well equipped to prevent abuses.
Against this exposition of the role of the children‘s court to advance
the welfare of the child and its reliance on the report of the social worker
indicating that the joint adoption would be in the best interests of the
children, there can be no doubt that the court in Du Toit was not prepared
to follow either the per se or the middle ground approach. In fact, it
availed itself comprehensively of the evidence that the sexual behavior of
the parents would not have a detrimental effect on the well-being of the
children.
At the time of writing of this article, the Child Care Act is still in
existence as only certain sections of the Children‘s Act92 have come into
operation. The Child Care Act has not been repealed as yet. It should be
noted, though, that chapter 15 of the Children‘s Act, which deals with the
adoption of children, is in line with the exposition in Du Toit and the

their children. Du Toit v Minister of Welfare & Population Dev., 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) para. 26 (S.
Afr.).
89. Child Care Act 74 of 1983 § 18(4)(a).
90. Id. at § 18(4)(b).
91. Id. at § 18(4)(c).
92. Children‘s Act 38 of 2005.
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other decisions discussed supra. In terms of this chapter the purposes of
adoption are to protect and nurture children by providing a safe, healthy
environment with positive support and to promote the goals of
permanency planning by connecting children to other safe and nurturing
family relationships intended to last a lifetime.93 Children may also only
be adopted if the adoption will be in the best interests of the child94 and if
the child is adoptable.95 An adoption social worker must make an
assessment whether a child is adoptable.96
Section 231 of the Children‘s Act deviates radically from the
provisions of the Child Care Act in respect to people who may adopt a
child. It provides that a child may be adopted jointly by a husband and
wife; partners in a permanent domestic relationship; or persons sharing a
common household and forming a permanent family unit.97 A child may
also be adopted individually by a widower or widow; divorced or
unmarried person; a married person whose spouse is the parent of the
child or by a person whose permanent domestic life-partner is the parent
of the child;98 by the biological father of a child born out of wedlock; or
by the foster parent of the child.99
It is important to note from the previous paragraph that
homosexuality is nowhere mentioned as a ground that disqualifies a
person as a prospective adoptive parent. This is also borne out by section
231(2), which provides that a prospective parent must be fit and proper
to be entrusted with full parental responsibilities and rights in respect of
the child; willing and able to undertake, exercise and maintain those
responsibilities and rights; over the age of 18; and properly assessed by
an adoption social worker to ensure that the person is fit and proper, and
willing and able as explained above.100 The adoption social worker may
take the cultural and community diversity of the adoptable child and
prospective adoptive parent into consideration in his or her assessment of
the prospective adoptive parent. A prospective adoptive parent also may

93. Id. at § 229.
94. Id. at § 230(1)(a).
95. Id. at § 230(1)(b).
96. Id. at § 230(2). A child is adoptable in terms of this section if he/she is an orphan and has
no guardian or caregiver who is willing to adopt the child; if the whereabouts of the child‘s parent or
guardian cannot be established; if the child has been abandoned; if the child‘s parent or guardian has
abused or deliberately neglected the child, or has allowed the child to be abused or deliberately
neglected; or the child is in need of permanent alternative placement.
97. Id. at § 231(1)(a).
98. It is important to note that section 13 of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 provides that the
legal consequences of marriage apply with such changes as may be required by the context to a civil
union.
99. Children‘s Act 38 of 2005 § 231(1)(b).
100. Id. at § 231(2).
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not be disqualified because of financial reasons—he or she may apply for
means-tested social assistance. A person unsuitable to work with children
is not a fit and proper person to adopt a child.101
Sections 239 and 240 further bear out on the consideration of an
adoption application. Section 239 prescribes, inter alia, that the adoption
social worker must furnish the court with a report which contains
information that the child is adoptable and that the adoption will be in the
best interest of the child. In terms of section 240 a court must take all
relevant factors into account, which may include the religious and
cultural background of the child, the child‘s parent, and the prospective
adoptive parent. It must also consider the report of the adoption social
worker and may only make an order for the adoption of a child if such
will be in the best interest of the child and if the prospective adoptive
parent complies with the requirements set out in section 231.
It certainly is not argued that the grounds listed in section 231
constitute a numerus clausus. In fact, it is abundantly clear that the
intention of the legislature is to convey discretion on the children‘s court
to ensure that the best interests of the child will prevail, while at the same
time not discriminating unfairly against homosexual persons who either
jointly or individually want to adopt the child. It is submitted that the
provision allowing a married person whose spouse is the parent of the
child102 along with the reference to partners in a domestic life-partnership
who may adopt a child conveys unambiguously that the legislature also
chose the nexus standard—the homosexuality of the prospective
adoptive parent or homosexual behavior will only be taken into
consideration if it will have an adverse effect on the child‘s best interests.
It is also submitted that this approach is in line with the reasoning of the
Constitutional Court in its interpretation of the Constitution in the
various decisions discussed above.
VI. CONCLUSION
The South African Constitution ―is not merely a formal document
regulating public power. It also embodies . . . an objective normative
value system.‖103 This system is rooted in the democratic values of
human dignity, equality, and freedom as embodied in the Bill of Rights
entrenched in the Constitution. In S v Makwanyane the Constitutional
Court considered the weight to be attached to public opinion in

101. Id. at § 231(2)(3), (4)(5)(6).
102. Civil Union Act 17 of 2006.
103. Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Sec. 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para. 54 (S. Afr.).
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contentious matters relating to dignity, equality, and freedom.104 The
court was even prepared to assume that public opinion would favor the
death penalty in extreme cases of murder. However, the court held that
the question before it was not what the majority of South Africans
believed to be a proper sentence, but on the contrary, what the
Constitution allowed. It further held that a court should not allow itself to
be diverted from its duty to act as an independent arbiter of the
Constitution by making choices on the basis that such choices would find
favor with the public.105 The development of the constitutional position
of lesbigay marriage and the relationship between such parents and
children certainly bear testimony to this approach—the very reason for
establishing the new constitutional order and for vesting the power of
judicial review of all legislation and the common law in the courts was to
protect the rights of minorities and others who cannot protect their rights
adequately through the democratic process. Those who are entitled to
claim this protection include the social outcasts and marginalized people
of society. It is only if there is a willingness to protect the worst and
weakest amongst us that all of us can be secure that our own rights will
be protected.106

104. 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
105. Id. para 87.
106. Id. para 88.

